W
hen a large environmental accident occurs, we expect large ecological consequences. When the disruption is due to human activities, as is the case with an oil spill, we expect the worst. Emotions can override sound judgment, and litigation can polarize positions and foster advocacy. Hyperbole replaces hypotheses, and science suffers the consequences.
Is there a more reasoned approach to determine the ecological consequences of environmental accidents? Over the past two decades, ecological risk assessment (box 1) has been championed as a rational way to reconcile a dispassionate, scientific approach with a more emotional response to environmental accidents (Burgman 2005) . Ecological risk assessment evaluates the magnitudes and probabilities of the adverse ecological effects of human activities (Suter 1993 , USEPA 1998 . It explicitly incorporates uncertainty, something that is often lacking in discussions of the consequences of environmental accidents. More important, ecological risk assessment provides a framework for clearly articulating the problem, identifying causal pathways linking the accident to potential consequences, evaluating evidence that the presumed causal linkages really exist, and determining whether the documented consequences are really germane to the problem. Ecological risk assessment does not tell managers or policymakers whether or how to respond to the ecological disruption-this involves societal as well as scientific judgments.
Harlequin ducks and the Exxon Valdez oil spill
Can ecological risk assessment help to clarify debates over the effects of lingering oil from the Exxon Valdez oil spill on harlequin ducks (Histrionicus histrionicus)? Harlequin ducks (figure 1) are small sea ducks that breed along clear, fastflowing streams and winter in shallow intertidal zones off rocky shorelines (Robertson and Goudie 1999) . In Prince William Sound (PWS), Alaska, abundances peak in the fall, when both resident and migrant birds are present. The life history attributes of harlequins make them especially vulnerable to marine oil spills, where oil accumulates in intertidal areas and may persist within some beaches.
When the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in PWS in March 1989, it spilled approximately 41 million liters of crude oil. Perhaps 40 percent of the spilled oil was stranded on approximately 800 kilometers (km) of shoreline (about 16 percent of the total shoreline of PWS; Wolfe et al. 1994 , Neff et al. 1995 . The spill path included areas in western PWS, leaving eastern PWS unoiled. As a result of intensive cleanup efforts and natural weathering, much of the oiled shoreline appeared to be free of oil within a year or two of the spill (figure 2). More rigorous assessments indicated that the amount and toxicity of oil in beach sediments decreased rapidly, and within four years these measures were a tiny fraction of their postspill magnitude (Neff et al. 1995) . Surveys in 2001 of areas that had been heavily oiled in 1989 found lingering Exxon Valdez oil scattered over an estimated area of 11.3 hectares (ha) of shoreline (Short et al. 2004) . Assuming an average beach width of 20 meters, this represents about 0.7 percent of the shoreline initially oiled by the spill. Debate continues about the amount of oil, its availability to organisms, and its possible effects on ecological systems in the sound (Harwell and Gentile 2006, Rice et al. 2007) .
Estimates of immediate mortality of harlequin ducks caused by direct exposure to oil after the spill range from fewer than 500 ducks killed (Rosenberg and Petrula 1998, Wiens et al. forthcoming) to nearly 1000 (Esler et al. 2002 , Rice et al. 2007 ). Concerns about potential long-term effects on harlequin ducks were also raised soon after the spill and continue to this day. Patten (1993) , for example, speculated that "a local extinction of Harlequin Ducks may occur within the spill area, " and Peterson (2001) concluded that "recovery...has not occurred rapidly following this acute-phase mortality [in 1989] and there is evidence of persistent chronic effects." On the basis of evidence available through 2005, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (2006) concluded that harlequin ducks "are recovering, but have not fully recovered from the effects of the oil spill," and Rice and colleagues (2007) stated that "population effects on Harlequin Ducks are evident still" and that the "poor recovery is probably due to foraging for intertidal invertebrates in oiled sediments. " Integral Consulting, Inc. (2006) , charged with reviewing published and unpublished evidence on spill effects in PWS, concluded that harlequin ducks should be classified as recovering, on the basis of evidence that direct effects of oil exposure are diminishing. On the other hand, Harwell and Gentile (2006) reported that "there currently are no detectable ecologically significant effects" of the spill on harlequins. Ecological risk assessment is a process for evaluating the likelihood that an environmental disruption will have adverse effects on ecological systems. Ecological risk assessment may be predictive, estimating the risks of actions yet to be taken (e.g., constructing a nuclear power plant), or retrospective, calculating the impacts of an event (e.g., an oil spill) that has already occurred. In either case, the process involves linking the existence of a hazard (e.g., oil transport by ships) to a stressor (e.g., spilled oil) to ecological consequences (e.g., oil-contaminated seabirds).
Ecological risk assessment entails three phases (USEPA 1998 , Burgman 2005 ):
1. An explicit formulation of the problem, usually framed as a hypothesis about whether and why certain ecological effects result from particular human activities, and a conceptual model of these relationships. Anticipated effects are clearly specified a priori, with reference to a goal stating the desired condition of the system and measurable end points. The intent is to avoid unfocused searches for anything that looks like an effect or for vague, unmeasurable end points (e.g., "recovery of a healthy population"). 2. An analysis phase, in which the exposure to stressors and the possible ecological consequences are evaluated. It is not a foregone conclusion that exposure (presence of oil) will have a particular ecological effect (reduced reproductive success). Instead, such relationships should be assigned a probability of occurrence; when doing so is not possible, the plausibility of the relationship should be assessed. 3. A characterization of the risk. The likelihood that a stressor actually caused particular ecological effects is evaluated. Uncertainties in the conceptual model, in the measurement of variables, and in the contributions of confounding variables, including natural variation in the environment or ecological system, are also assessed.
This process results in a reasoned, objective, and (insofar as possible) quantitative assessment of the likelihood that a particular environmental event will have, or did have, an ecologically significant (as opposed to statistically significant) effect on a specified property of an ecological system (Harwell and Gentile 2006) . Ecological risk assessment provides a framework for distinguishing between the presumed consequences of an environmental disruption that can be detected and those that are likely to matter ecologically, in terms of the specified end point and assessment measures.
Box 1. What is ecological risk assessment?
The cumulative effects of unrelated environmental changes since 1989 (Wiens et al. 2004 ) and disagreements about how to define and measure "recovery" Wiens 2005, Integral Consulting, Inc. 2006 ) complicate assessments of the status of harlequin ducks in areas affected by the spill. For example, sea-surface temperatures and ocean salinity in the North Pacific are influenced not only by annual phenomena such as ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation) events but also by decadal-scale shifts in climate and oceanography that are superimposed on longer-term trends in ocean conditions related to global warming (Mantua and Hare 2002 , Peterson and Schwing 2003 , Litzow 2006 , Royer and Grosch 2006 . Collectively, these dynamics render assessments of recovery based on such equilibrium metrics as "a return to prespill conditions" problematic. Instead, one must assess recovery in the context of the natural variability and desired state of the system and the underlying assumptions about the dynamics of the system, which in turn will determine the appropriateness of different study designs. Parker and Wiens (2005) discuss these issues in detail.
Application of the ecological risk assessment framework
Oil spills can affect seabirds through a variety of pathways, including direct ingestion of oil, oiling of feathers (which can lead to hypothermia), increased predation risk, avoidance of oiled habitat, reduction in prey availability, and effects on reproduction (Wiens 1995) . With the passage of time since the Exxon Valdez spill, attention has shifted from documenting the effects of direct oil exposure to evaluating potential indirect effects, which either take several years to appear (delayed impacts) or pass through several intermediate steps before affecting the birds (cascading effects). Wiens and colleagues (2004) found no evidence that any of the 25 bird species they analyzed exhibited delayed effects on their occupancy of habitats that were initially oiled by the spill. Evidence of delayed impacts, however, is difficult to interpret, because as more time passes after a spill event, other things happen, obscuring clear cause-effect linkages.
As time has passed since the Exxon Valdez spill, there has also been a shift in the scale or level of impact expected. Perhaps in response to the magnitude of overall seabird mortality immediately following the spill (an estimated 250,000 birds; Piatt and Ford 1996) , the initial focus was on population-level effects. Later, attention shifted increasingly to potential impacts on individuals, which might or might not translate into larger population-level consequences. In the concluding section of this article, I consider the broader implications of this shift in levels.
Suggestions about cascading indirect effects on individuals have emerged as the dominant theme in debates about the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on harlequin ducks , Harwell and Gentile 2006 , Rice et al. 2007 . Such pathways are particularly amenable to ecological risk assessment. Here I focus on one well-defined pathway linking the oiling of the habitat to the condition of the harlequin ducks' prey, to the physiological state of the birds, and, ultimately, to their reproduction and abundance. Patten (1994) developed a scenario of cascading effects of the oil spill that can be recast as exactly the sort of hypotheses that underlie an ecological risk assessment. Patten argued that (a) many beds of blue mussels (Mytilus trossulus) were oiled by the spill; (b) residual subsurface oil trapped beneath these beds retained toxic components that were taken up by the mussels and concentrated in their tissues; and (c) harlequin ducks feeding on these mussels then accumulated these contaminants in their tissues, at sufficient levels to cause (d) physiological changes and reproductive failure, contributing to (e) population declines in oiled areas. The first step in an ecological risk assessment is to convert this argument into a conceptual model of causal hypotheses linking events with outcomes (figure 3). This logic tree (Burgman 2005) can then be evaluated using the available evidence. Even if information is not available to assign probabilities to the relationships (as is usually the case in retrospective analyses), this approach should allow us to judge the likelihood or plausibility of a hypothesized link and its importance.
Evidence is evaluated in the analysis phase. Taking the elements of figure 3 (hypotheses) in turn, we can first ask whether there is exposure to the stressor (spilled oil). The answer to this question depends on the amount and distribution of residual oil remaining in the environment and the likelihood that harlequin ducks will encounter those areas containing oil. Surveys conducted shortly after the spill indicated that approximately 16 percent of the 4800 km of shoreline surrounding PWS was oiled, and that the extent of visibly oiled shoreline had decreased to 0.2 percent by 1992 (Neff et al. 1995, Harwell and Gentile 2006) . There was a continued, steady decline in the geographic extent and amount of shoreline oiling from 1992 to 2002 (Taylor and Reimer 2005) . In addition, in 2001, Short and colleagues (2004) sampled subsurface sediments from areas that had initially been moderately to heavily oiled by the spill, many of which were still heavily oiled in the period 1990-1993. They recorded subsurface oil residues from the Exxon Valdez spill in 347 of the 4249 quadrats sampled (8.2 percent); nearly 3/4 of these oiled samples produced only a light oil film or were lightly oiled (Paul D. Boehm, Exponent, Maynard, MA, personal communication, 18 April 2007) . Most of these oiled sites were on boulder-cobble shorelines where subsurface oil is protected from erosion and tidal weathering (Michel et al. 2006) , and most were only lightly or moderately oiled at that time. Extrapolating from these samples, Short and colleagues (2004) concluded that some 11 ha of PWS shoreline continued to be contaminated by surface or subsurface Exxon Valdez oil residues in 2001. Using the annual loss rate of beached oil volume of 20 to 26 percent derived by Short and colleagues (2004) , Harwell and Gentile (2006) Initially, the spill oiled many shoreline areas potentially frequented by harlequin ducks, and early analyses indicated that the use of moderately or heavily oiled areas by harlequins was significantly lower than that of unoiled areas (Day et al. 1997 , Wiens et al. 2004 ). These areas differed in habitat features other than oiling, however; moderately and heavily oiled bays had less complex (convoluted) shorelines, more rocky cliffs, less intertidal coverage of Fucus and seagrass, fewer streams supporting salmon runs, and less open conifer woodland in the adjacent supratidal habitats than did unoiled or lightly oiled reference bays (Wiens et al. 2001) . When these and other habitat variables were included as covariates in the analyses, the significant negative relationships with oiling level disappeared (Wiens et al. 2004 ). Integral Consulting, Inc. The scenario shown in figure 3 emphasizes the exposure of harlequin prey, particularly blue mussels, to oil. Many intertidal mussel beds were in fact oiled, some quite heavily. Relatively unweathered oil was retained beneath some beds, particularly on sites with low wave energy and fine-grained sediments (Carls et al. 2001) . Such sediments constitute less than 4 percent of the shoreline of the spill area, however (Boehm et al. 1996) ; furthermore, most of the mussel beds were small, and the oil was patchily distributed in those beds that were oiled. Boehm and colleagues (1996) estimated that, of the intertidal mussels present in the spill area in 1993, less than 3 percent occurred on contaminated sediments, and few of the samples in which Short and colleagues (2004) documented subsurface oil residues in 2001 occurred in conjunction with mussel beds. Considering a broader array of oiled sites than mussel beds, O'Clair and colleagues (1996) and Wolfe and colleagues (1994) found levels of total polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) to be at prespill background levels by 1990 or 1991. Subsequently, Harwell and Gentile (2006) concluded that the magnitude of residual Exxon Valdez oil as a continuing source of hydrocarbon contamination is now "a small fraction of 1% of what was available immediately after the spill." Based on mussel PAH levels in 1995, Carls and colleagues (2001) predicted that it would take three decades for oiled mussel beds to recover. However, by 1999, oil concentrations in those same oiled mussel beds were "typically at baseline levels" (Carls et al. 2004 ).
The causal pathway of figure 3 assumes that mussels take up and bioaccumulate hydrocarbons in their tissues. Bivalves are widely known to concentrate contaminants in their tissues, and PAH levels were indeed high in mussels occupying heavily oiled areas immediately after the spill. Concentrations decreased rapidly, however, and mean PAH levels in mussels from oiled and unoiled sites did not differ significantly after 1992 (Hoff and Shigenaka 1999) .
The sequence depicted in figure 3 assumes that harlequin ducks consume significant quantities of blue mussels. Patten and colleagues (Patten 1994 , Patten et al. 2000 found that the diet of harlequins in PWS was composed chiefly of snails, chitons, and limpets and contained only approximately 8 percent mussels by frequency and volume. Harlequins forage primarily on small individual mussels, which would have been present in large numbers for only a few years after mussel beds were reestablished following the oil spill. Of 75 harlequins collected from the spill zone soon after the spill, however, only 3 contained hydrocarbon-contaminated prey, and none of those contaminated birds actually contained mussels (Patten et al. 2000) .
What is the evidence that eating contaminated prey has led to an uptake of contaminants by the birds? Direct linkage is lacking, but a causal relationship has been inferred from assays of the enzyme ethoxyresorufin-O-deethylase (EROD) in the liver tissue of birds from different areas of PWS. EROD levels provide an indirect measure of the induction of cytochrome P450 1A (CYP1A), a protein produced in response to exposure to a variety of xenobiotic chemicals, particularly certain planar halogenated hydrocarbons (PHHs) and PAHs (Bucheli and Fent 1995, Whyte et al. 2000) . Trust and colleagues (2000) reported significantly higher EROD levels in harlequins collected from oiled areas of PWS than in those from unoiled areas in 1998. The differences between areas persisted in 2000, but sampling in 2001 and 2002 indicated that EROD levels in the two areas no longer differed (although preliminary results from 2004 to 2005 suggested that EROD levels in harlequins again differed significantly among areas) (Integral Consulting, Inc. 2006 , Rice et al. 2007 ). Interpretation of these differences, however, is not straightforward. Although the 95 percent confidence intervals for EROD values reported by Trust and colleagues (2000) for oiled and unoiled areas did not overlap, the ranges did overlap considerably, and the sample with the highest level of EROD activity came from the unoiled area. Moreover, CYP1A production is induced by exposure to a variety of PHHs and PAHs, and separating an Exxon Valdez signal from the noise of the many other sources of hydrocarbons in PWS is not easy (Huggett et al. 2003, Harwell and Gentile 2006) . Boehm and colleagues (1996) addressed the question of exposure in another way, by estimating the PAH dosages that harlequin ducks would experience if they were to consume a diet of 30 percent mussels exclusively from oiled mussel beds. This analysis indicated that, even under this unrealistic assumption, estimated dosages four years after the oil spill would be one to three orders of magnitude less than those known to produce sublethal effects in laboratory tests with waterfowl. Moreover, when Bodkin and colleagues (2003) fed highly contaminated food to captive harlequin ducks, they found no significant effects on metabolic rate, daily energy expenditure, or feeding behavior, although EROD levels were greater in the test birds than in the control birds.
What is the evidence that the reproductive performance of harlequin ducks suffered because of the oil spill? Laboratory tests relating oil exposure to reproduction in harlequin ducks have not been conducted, so assessments of these effects rely on comparisons between observed production (numbers of broods) in the unoiled eastern sound and in the patchily oiled western sound. Several studies (see Wiens et al. forthcoming) showed that harlequin broods were almost nonexistent in western PWS following the spill, whereas broods were seen regularly in eastern PWS. These differences in reproductive output initially were attributed to the spill (Patten et al. 1995) , although by 1999 the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (1999) admitted that "conclusions of reproductive failure based on lack of broods in the oiled area do not now seem warranted." It now appears that PWS-wide differences in reproduction are associated with differences in potential breeding habitat between the study areas (Rosenberg and Petrula 1998, Wiens et al. forthcoming) .
The final element in Patten's (1994) causal chain (figure 3) links hydrocarbon exposure to reduced abundance in the spill-affected area. Esler and colleagues (2000) recorded lower overwinter survival of females in the mid-1990s in previously oiled areas of western PWS than in unoiled eastern PWS, differences that have been associated with elevated EROD levels (Rice et al. 2007 ) and with population declines in western PWS during the same period (Rosenberg and Petrula 1998) . Other analyses, however, found no differences in population trends between these regions over the 15 years following the spill (Integral Consulting, Inc. 2006, Wiens et al. forthcoming) , and preliminary analyses indicate no differences in winter survival between the areas from 2000 to 2003 (Integral Consulting, Inc. 2006 , Rice et al. 2007 ). The relationship of survival to population trends in general, and specifically to the initial or lingering effects of the Exxon Valdez spill, remains unclear.
There clearly are differences in harlequin abundance between different portions of PWS, however. At a broad scale of resolution, population levels in the oiled (western) part of the sound were lower following the spill than in the unoiled (eastern) region, and they have remained lower for 15 years (Wiens et al. forthcoming) . Abundances were also lower in western PWS than in eastern PWS well before the spill in 1984, however, suggesting inherent differences in habitat suitability beyond which the spill had only short-term effects. Analyses conducted at a finer scale of resolution (Day et al. 1997 , Wiens et al. 2004 indicated that the population densities of harlequins were substantially lower in oiled than in unoiled bays both before and after the spill, although densities increased proportionately more in the previously oiled bays from 1997 to 2001 than in the unoiled bays. Collectively, these analyses indicate that habitat plays a greater role in determining variations in harlequin abundance in PWS than does oiling history or any lingering effect of the spill.
Putting the pieces together: Characterizing risk
In a standard ecological risk assessment, one assigns probabilities to each element of a conceptual model linking a stressor (e.g., spilled oil) to consequences (e.g., reduced reproduction) that produce ecologically significant impacts (e.g., reduced abundance). That isn't possible in this case, but one can use the framework of an ecological risk assessment to evaluate the plausibility of each step in the sequence.
Persistence of oil residues in the intertidal. The amount, extent, severity, and toxicity of the Exxon Valdez oil remaining on the shorelines of PWS, either as surface deposits (tar) or as weathered subsurface residues, have diminished steadily following the spill. The little oil that does remain occurs in small, isolated patches, primarily on boulder-cobble beaches and midintertidal beaches in protected areas.
Harlequin duck co-occurrence with oiled shorelines. Analyses of habitat use by harlequins showed no statistically significant relationship between the oiling history of bays in PWS and the occurrence and abundance of ducks, once habitat variables were included as covariates (Wiens et al. 2004 ). This suggests that harlequins might encounter oiled shorelines in proportion to the occurrence of such shorelines in PWS. Because little shoreline still contains oil residues, however, the overall distribution of harlequins in PWS now includes very little shoreline with residual oil.
Mussel exposure to oil. The extent and toxicity of oil in shoreline sediments diminished rapidly following the spill, and within four years few mussel beds occurred on contaminated substrates. Little of the oil that remains lies under mussel beds. The likelihood that subsurface Exxon Valdez hydrocarbons would be available for uptake by mussels is extremely low; if present, they would be restricted to a tiny percentage of the mussel beds in the spill-affected area.
Bioaccumulation of hydrocarbons by mussels. PAH concentrations in mussels exposed to oil were at background levels for PWS within a few years of the spill.
Ducks eating contaminated mussels. Very few of the birds collected in 1989, when oiling levels were high, contained contaminated prey. Moreover, mussels constitute only a small proportion of the diet of harlequins. It is highly unlikely that now, with little Exxon Valdez oil remaining in only a few scattered locations, a harlequin would encounter or ingest contaminated mussels.
Elevated hydrocarbons in duck tissues. No direct evidence links ingestion of contaminated prey to elevated levels of hydrocarbons in harlequins. The EROD analyses suggest that the exposure of harlequin ducks to PAHs, through whatever pathways, varies among locations and years. In view of the restricted and patchy distribution of lingering Exxon Valdez oil in PWS, it is unlikely that this source would determine EROD levels in birds collected some distance away.
Impaired reproduction and reproductive failure. Harlequin duck reproduction is clearly lower in western than in eastern PWS. There are considerable differences in breeding habitat between the two regions, however (Wiens et al. forthcoming) , suggesting that the association with the spill pathway is incidental.
Reduced abundance. Population trends show inconsistent relationships with the oiling history of different areas of PWS. Population densities were consistently lower in western than in eastern PWS before as well as after the oil spill, suggesting that the association with oiling history is incidental.
Conclusions: The value of ecological risk assessment
Ecological risk assessment promotes a rational examination of the evidence explicitly linking causes with effects, so that managers and decisionmakers can make a reasoned judgment of future risks or of the likely consequences of past activities. It is not the only way to establish causation in ecological systems, of course (see, e.g., Peters 1991 , Ford 2000 . One other approach, "ecoepidemiology" (Bro-Rasmussen and Lokke 1984, Fox 1991) , builds on the methods of drawing causal inferences developed in epidemiology by establishing the probability, time order, strength of association, specificity, consistency, predictability, and coherence of a presumed relationship between a suspected cause and consequent effects. These criteria are built into much of the ecological risk assessment framework, albeit not explicitly. In practice, however, the ecoepidemiological paradigm appears to be somewhat lax in its application, resting too often on "it is unless it isn't" assertions that may render tests unfalsifiable. For example, Fox (1991) argues that consistency in the presumed causal relationships across multiple systems and species is critical, but notes that "lack of consistency does not rule out a causal association," and that a predictable dose-response relationship may support a causal linkage but "its absence has little bearing on whether an association is causal or not." Such flexibility in the logical rules of the game would seem to limit the usefulness of this approach, and it is not surprising that the more formalized approach of ecological risk assessment has been more widely adopted (USEPA 1998 , Burgman 2005 .
A retrospective ecological risk assessment such as that presented here is complicated by several issues. First, environments vary, and places like PWS are especially dynamic in time and space. The environmental disruption caused by this oil spill was superimposed on a backdrop of natural variation. Spatial variation (e.g., among habitats) and temporal variation (e.g., among years) must therefore be considered when assessing possible effects (Wiens and Parker 1995) . Much of the evidence available to evaluate the linkages shown in figure 3 comes from short-term studies or from investigations that did not properly address spatial variation (for example, by combining areas with quite different oiling histories in western PWS [see figure 4 ] into a single region).
Second, oil in the environment is only one of many factors affecting these systems. Spilled oil is carried by currents and deposited on shorelines in a distinctly nonrandom fashion. The distribution of habitats also varies nonrandomly, but not in the same way. Birds may respond to both distributions, but at scales that do not coincide with the scales of oiling (or habitat) distribution. Too often, studies are designed as if the contamination were the only thing that mattered. Singlefactor approaches are of limited value in a multifactor world.
Third, environmental contamination affects individuals, and it is important to recognize those effects. But often it is the population-level consequences of those individual effects that are most relevant to management, restoration, or legal proceedings. It is important to be clear about the level or levels on which one is assessing effects or inferring consequences. Because the number of individuals (or proportion of a population) affected by an oil spill decreases as time passes, extrapolation from individuals to populations becomes more uncertain over time.
Fourth, assessments are plagued by numerous sources of uncertainty. These uncertainties stem from errors or limitations inherent in study designs or measurements, from natural variation in the multiple factors noted above, and from linguistic ambiguity. For example, evaluations of the effects of an environmental accident are usually cast in terms of recovery of the damaged resource, but there are multiple meanings of "recovery" Wiens 2005, Scott et al. 2005) . Moreover, when one aggregates risks or likelihoods over multiple elements in a causal chain (e.g., figure 3 ), uncertainties multiply, reducing the value of an ecological risk assessment, especially if the overall goal is tinged with uncertainty.
Despite these difficulties, ecological risk assessment can bring clarity to situations that are complex and often socially charged. This is important, as it is difficult to maintain scientific rigor and avoid an unconscious (or conscious) drift into advocacy or "normative science" (Lackey 2001 , Landis 2007 in such situations. When advocacy becomes mixed with science, the objectivity and rigor of the scientific process suffer (Wiens 1996) . Ecological risk assessment provides a way to expose one's underlying assumptions to scrutiny, and to assess whether a logical chain linking a purported cause to a presumed effect has a real likelihood of reaching that end point. In the example I have addressed, ecological risk assessment permits a transparent assessment of the likelihood that the Exxon Valdez oil spill has had long-term, continuing effects on harlequin ducks via ingestion of contaminated mussels. This likelihood now seems remote.
